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Abstract
In this paper, we extend the concept of stability to vertical collusive agreements, involving downstream
and upstream rms, using a setup of successive Cournot oligopolies. We show that a stable vertical agreement
always exists: the unanimous vertical agreement involving all downstream and upstream rms. Thus, stable
vertical collusive agreements exist even for market structures in which horizontal cartels would be unstable.
We also show that there are economies for which the unanimous agreement is not the only stable one.
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1 Introduction
In the present paper, we study the existence of stable vertical collusive agreements in the context of successive
oligopolies. Such collusive agreements simultaneously embody downstream and upstream rms. Collusion is
represented as an agreement through which the insiders act in unison, reducing thereby the total number of
decision units operating in the downstream and upstream markets and, thus, the corresponding number of
oligopolists in each of them. Collusive outcomes are the Cournot equilibria corresponding to these reduced
numbers of oligopolists, which are then compared with those arising when downstream and upstream rms act
independently from each other in their respective markets.
More than half a century ago, Stigler (1950) has stressed the main di¢ culty encountered by a cartel promoter:
"the major di¢ culty in forming a merger is that it is more protable to be outside a merger than to be a
participant. The outsider sells at the same price but at the much larger output at which marginal cost equals
price. Hence, the promoter of a merger is likely to receive much encouragement from each rm, almost every
encouragement, in fact, except participation". This sentence clearly illustrates the need for analyzing carefully
under which conditions a cartel is expected to resist to the forces acting against its stability.
A denition of cartel stability, relying on two natural requirements, namely, external stability and internal
stability, has been proposed by dAspremont et al., 1983, in the context of horizontal mergers. A cartel with n
rms in an industry embodying K rms (n  K) is said internally stable when the prots realized by each rm
member of the cartel exceeds the prots obtained when being outside of it, taking into account the change in
the prots of an outsider resulting from this exit. Similarly, a cartel with K members is externally stable when
the prots of a rm member of a cartel of size K + 1 are smaller than the prots realized by an outsider when
the cartel is of size K: A cartel of size K is stable when it is both internally and externally stable. Formally,
assuming that all rms are identical, and dening f (K) (resp. c(K)) the payo¤ received by each outsider
(resp. by each cartel member), a cartel of size K is stable if both the inequalities
c(K)  f (K   1)
(internal stability) and
f (K + 1)  c(K)
(external stability) hold simultaneously.
This denition of stability is rather abstract since it does not state how the prots of an insider or an
outsider are dened or, equivalently, to which market structure it corresponds. As a consequence, the above
abstract denition can be applied to a wide variety of market situations and corresponding payo¤sstructures.
Nevertheless, the denition of stability assumes that each member of the agreement receives the same share
of prots, c(K); and, similarly, that each outsider obtains an equal amount of prots, f (K). One way
to rationalize this assumption consists in supposing that all rms in the industry are identical, with the sole
exception that either they participate to the collusive agreement, or decide to remain outsiders. This assumption
then allows to share equally the prots inside the entity among its members through an argument of equal
treatment. Furthermore, supposing an identical strategic behavior for the outsiders allows to state by an
argument of symmetry that each one of them also should obtain an equal amount of prots at the solution.
With these assumptions, given an entity of size K; prot sharing among rms is fully described by two numbers:
the share of prots received by each participant, c(K), and the prots received by each outsider, f (K).
A rst example of market structure and associated payo¤s for which stability has been analyzed can be
found in the paper referred to above (dAspremont et al., 1983). The solution at which the prots are evaluated
are those corresponding to the price leadership model introduced by Markham (1951). In this version, the
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cartel (collusive agreement) is assumed to be the price-leader (the dominant rm) maximizing its prots on the
"residual demand function", while the outsiders are behaving competitively, taking the price set by the cartel
as given. It is easily seen that, for this specic market situation and payo¤s structure, any cartel is always
internally unstable simply because, according to the argument put forward by Stigler (1950), the per-rm prots
of a cartel member are smaller than the prots obtained by each outsider. But this remark does not prevent
the existence of at least one stable cartel, as demonstrated in dAspremont et al. (1983).
A second example of market structure in which a collusive agreement is considered corresponds to the version
proposed by Salant, Schwitzer and Reynolds (1983) of the Cournot model. Compared with the price-leadership
model, this approach consists in assuming that a collusive agreement among K rms takes place, according to
which these rms maximize per rm prots against the output choice of the outsiders. This situation represents
the Cournot equilibrium of the game consisting of the entity and n   K outsiders. In this setup, stability
has been analyzed by Sha¤er (1995) and Belleamme and Peitz (2010). Assuming linear inverse demand and
constant marginal cost, Sha¤er (1995) shows that, whenever n  3; there exists no stable horizontal cartel in
the Cournot game. In a recent paper, Zu et al, (2012), borrowing from Konishi and Lin (1999), study the size
of horizontal stable cartels using general specications for the output demand and cost function. These authors
conrm that, even with a more general specication, the size of stable horizontal cartels remains quite reduced.
The main reason why cartel stability fails in Cournot competition refers to the Stigler statement reminded in
the beginning of this paper: outsiders are always better o¤ than insiders, destroying thereby internal stability
in the Cournot game. Accordingly, contrary to the price leadership model in which there always exists a stable
cartel, the Cournot game with linear output demand and constant marginal cost has never a stable cartel when
the number of rms exceeds three.
The above studies all refer to collusive agreements embodying downstream rms only, excluding thereby
more general forms of collusive agreements, like those arising when some downstream and upstream rms are
allowed to combine together. Extending stability analysis to such collusive agreements is undoubtedly interesting
and important. Real-life collusive entities often share the property that, among the participating rms, some
of them operate in the upstream market(s) and produce the input(s) used by the downstream rms in the
production of the nal good. Such agreements have been studied by Salinger (1988), Gaudet and van Long
(1996) and, more recently, by Gabszewicz and Zanaj (2011). However, to the best of our knowledge, the analysis
of collusive stability in this context has not yet been pursued. Probably this is so because some assumptions
used in the traditional approach seem inappropriate in this new set-up. Among these assumptions is the one
stating that each member of the agreement must receive the same share of the entitys prots. From the very
nature of the problem, the rms participating the entity belong to di¤erent types, some producing the nal good
(downstream rms) while the others produce the input (upstream rms). When downstream and upstream rms
are allowed to combine together, with both upstream and downstream rms in the collusive agreement, there is
no longer any reason to assume that both types of rms should get the same share of the entitys prots. Thus
a conceptual problem arises: how prots should be shared among the members of the collusive entity, knowing
that these members are not all identical, but belong to two di¤erent types? We meet this di¢ culty in the
present paper by requiring that the redistribution of total prots of the entity among its members guarantees
to each of them an amount of prots at least as high as the prots it would obtain when leaving the entity,
taking into account the change in prots resulting from its move .
This denition of stability is a direct extension of the denition of stability in dAspremont et al (1983). It
requires that no rm in the entity would get more when leaving the entity than when staying inside (internal
stability), taking into account the change in prots resulting from its move. Furthermore it requires that no
rm outside the identity would obtain more when entering the entity than staying outside, again taking into
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account the change in prots resulting from its move (external stability).
A vertical collusive agreement has three e¤ects: (i) it softens double marginalization for the entity boosting
its prot; (ii) it reduces the number of active upstream rms in the upstream market leading to a shift upwards
of the input supply and it reduces the number of downstream rms that buy the input in the input market
causing a shift downwards of the input demand schedule. The balance of these two shifts can lead to an increase
of a decrease of the equilibrium input price; and, nally, (iii) it creates asymmetries in the production costs of
the downstream rms: the entity produces at the marginal cost while the downstream rms do it at the market
price. The e¤ect on the equilibrium output price is ambiguous. The equilibrium output price increases if the
output quantity increases due to the presence of the entity, or it may decrease, otherwise. The stability of the
vertical entity depends on the balance of these three e¤ects. It is clear that the combination of these e¤ects
leads to extremely complex consequences di¢ cult to disentangle. However we are able to show that, in the
class of linear economies (linear demand function in the downstream market and constant returns to scale in
production), the vertical agreement involving all rms, downstream and upstream, always constitutes a stable
vertical agreement. We also provide examples of some economies, in which this agreement is not the only one to
be stable: we exhibit an example in which both the unanimous agreement and another one, involving a strictly
smaller number of rms, are simultaneously stable.
To conclude, while the literature on the stability of vertical collusive agreement is not developed yet, there is
a related literature to our paper on the sustainability of a cartel in vertically related industries. Two important
contributions in this literature are Nocke and White (2007) and Piccolo and Miklos-Thal (2012). Nocke and
White (2007) analyse the collusive agreement among upstream rms, some of which might be vertically inte-
grated with downstream rms. In their paper, the vertical mergers impacts positively the upstream collusion.
Piccolo and Miklos-Thal (2012) study collusive agreements among downstream rms who collude on their input
supply contracts. They show that an implicit agreement on input supply contracts with above cost wholesale
prices and slotting fees facilitates collusion in the downstream market.
2 Stability of vertical agreements and successive oligopolies
2.1 The denition of stability
In the following we call vertical agreement any collusive entity involving simultaneously both downstream and
upstream rm(s). In order to examine the question of stability in the case of vertical agreements, we need
a framework in which these are analyzed and rmspayo¤s dened. This framework is provided in Salinger
(1988) and, more recently, by the authors in Gabszewicz and Zanaj (2011), in which they propose a denition of
successive oligopolies allowing a precise concept of vertical agreement. The nature of the agreement concerns (i)
the payo¤division among downstream and upstream participants and the behavior of the insider upstream rms
with respect to the input market. In the present paper, we assume that upstream participants in the vertical
agreement do not participate directly in the upstream market and receive at least the prot of an upstream
rm outside the entity. More specically, we assume that each upstream rm receives the prot of an outsider
upstream rm plus a prot "bonus" that should in principle guarantee the interest of the upstream rms to
participate in the agreement. Of course, this prot bonus should leave the downstream rms still interested to
participate in the agreement. We leave open the door to any agreement between the rms on the exact amount
of such a bonus.
To dene precisely the notion of stability of vertical agreements, consider two successive markets embodying
n identical downstream rms and m identical upstream rms, m  2. Assume that K;K  n; downstream
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rms and H;H  m; upstream rms decide to collude. For further use, we dene the specic vertical agreement
in which K = n and H = m; the unanimous vertical agreement : this vertical agreement involves all rms
operating in either of the successive markets. Notice this entity now involves two types of agents, all identical
in each type. An entity of size K + H is stable when it is both internally and externally stable, for each type
of agents. Dene formally f (K;H) (resp. c(K;H)) the payo¤ received by each downstream outsider (resp.
by each participant), and  f (K;H) (resp.  c(K;H)) the payo¤ received by each upstream outsider (resp. by
participant). Then,
Denition A vertical entity of size K +H is stable if both the sets of inequalities
c(K;H)  f (K   1; H) and  c(K;H)   f (K;H   1) (1)
(internal stability) and
f (K + 1; H)  c(K;H) and  f (K;H + 1)   c(K;H) (2)
(external stability) hold simultaneously.
This denition directly extends the denition of stability provided by dAspremont et al (1983) to agreements
that include two types of rms. More precisely, a vertical collusive agreement embodyingK+H is said internally
stable when the prots realized by each type of rm, downstream and upstream, member of the entity, exceeds
the prots obtained when being outside of it, taking into account the change in the prots of an outsider,
resulting from this exit. Similarly, a vertical entity with K+H members is externally stable when the prots of
a rm, upstream or downstream, member of an entity of size K + 1 or/and H + 1 are smaller than the prots
realized by an outsider, downstream and upstream, when the entity is of size K+H: This denition of stability
translates into requiring four conditions to be satised.
2.2 The linear model
Now let us apply this denition of stability to the well-known case of linear output demand and constant returns
to scale in successive Cournot oligopolies. Let the demand function for some output in the downstream market
be given by p(Q) = 1   Q; where Q denotes aggregate supply. Consider n downstream rms producing the
output via a constant returns technology f(z) = z;  > 0; as well as m upstream rms initially supplying the
market for the input z at a constant marginal cost equal to ;  > 0. Now assume that H upstream rms,
h = 1; 2:::H; form a vertical collusive agreement with K downstream rms k = 1; 2; :::K; and maximize joint
prots together. Also assume that K < n and H < m .1 After this agreement, the downstream and upstream
markets move from an initial situation with n active downstream rms andm active upstream rms, to a market
structure with n K + 1 active rms in the downstream market and m H in the upstream one.2
Consider rst how the prot functions write in the downstream market after the collusive agreement. To this
end denote by I the entity resulting from the agreement. The prots I of the entity I to which K downstream
rms participate is given by
I(qI;q I) = (1  qI  
X
i 6=I
qi)qI    qI

(3)
1This assumption guarantees that there always exists at least one rm on each side of the upstream market so that the cartel
cannot exclude the outsider downstream rms to have access to the input. A similar asssumption in another approach to collusion
has been used by Gabszewicz and Hansen (1971).
2An example of this type of vertical collusive agreement is the agreement taking place in a market among one or several
wholesalers with one or several retailers that xes the price at which the market product is sold to the nal consumers. For
example, the French Competition Council in 2008 sanctioned ve toys manufacturers and three distributors on grounds of collusion
during the Christmas period between 2001 and 2004. ( La Revue, 2008)
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where qI (resp.
P
i 6=I qi ) denotes the supply of the entity (resp. rms not in the agreement) in the downstream
market and  is its unit production cost. As for the downstream rms that do not participate in the agreement,
each of them obtains a payo¤ i dened by
i(qi; qk) = (1  qI   qi  
X
k 6=i
qk)qi   !(qi

); (4)
with i; i 6= I; and ! denoting the unit price in the input market.3 Notice that from the comparison between (3)
and (4), it appears immediately that, while the collusive members in the downstream market pay their input at
marginal cost , the rivals pay the input price !: Since I is concave in qI , we may use the rst order condition
to get the best reply function qI of the entity in the downstream market game as
qI(qi6=I) =
1    
P
i6=I qi
2
:
As for an outsider downstream rm i, its best reply qi in the downstream market is conditional on the input
price ! realized in the upstream market, namely
qi(qI ; qk; !) =
1  !  

qI +
P
k 6=i;k 6=I qk

2
:
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium among the colluded downstream rms, we get the resulting Cournot equilib-
rium in the downstream market, namely, the optimal supply coming from the entity qI and from each of the
rivals qi which do not belong to the cartel, namely
qI (K;!) =
   + (n K)(!   )
(n K + 2) ; (5)
and
qi (K;!) =
+    2!
 (n K + 2) : (6)
It is worth noting that the equilibrium in the downstream market depends on the input price obtained in the
upstream market as an immediate consequence of supply and demand for the input. Taking into account (6)
and the fact that q = f(z) = z, it is easy to derive the input demand resulting from the n K outsider rms
in the downstream market, i.e.
P
i 6=I zi(!) = (n K)( + 2!2(N K+2) ): As for the input supply, it comes from the
strategies sj ; j 6= I; selected by the outsider upstream rms in the input market. Consider the jth upstream
rm not participating in the entity. Its prots  j at the vector of strategies (sj ; s j) write as
 j(sj ; S j) = !(sj ; S j)sj   sj ; (7)
with S j =
P
 j 6=I s j : Taking into account that !(sj ; s j) has to make demand equal to supply in the upstream
market, namely,
P
j 6=I sj =
P
i 6=I zi(!) ; we obtain
!(sj ; s j) =
(+ )(n K)  2(n K + 2)Pj 6=I sj
2 (n K) (8)
where
P
j 6=I sj = S j + sj : Accordingly, the payo¤ of the j-th upstream rm writes as
 j(sj ; s j) =

(+)(n K) 2(n K+2)Pj 6=I sj
2(n K)

sj   sj :
3Notice that the set fk : k 6= ig includes the index I:
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It is immediate to derive from the above the best reply function sj = sj(S j): Using the symmetry condition
S j = (m H   1)s j ; we derive the optimal input supply sj coming from the j-th outsider rm, namely
sj (K;H) =
(  ) (n K)
2(n K + 2)(m H + 1) :
Substituting the expression of sj in (8) we get the equilibrium input price
!(H) =
+  + 2(m H)
2 (m H + 1) : (9)
Substituting (9) in (6) and (5) we get the output supply of each outsider downstream rm qi and that of the
cartel qI , respectively,
qi (K;H) =
(m H) (  )
 (n K + 2) (m H + 1) ; (10)
and
qI (K;H) =
(  )(n K + 2(m H + 1)
2(n K + 2)(m H + 1) :
It follows immediately that prots at equilibrium of the entity I , and of the outsider rms 

i (K;H) in the
downstream market, write as
I(K;H) =
( )2
42
(2(m H)+n K+2)2
(n K+2)2(m H+1)2 ; (11)
and
i (K;H) =
( )2
2
(m H)2
(n K+2)2(m H+1)2 ; (12)
respectively. The prot of an outsider upstream rm is
 j (K;H) =
( )2
22
(n K)
(n K+2)(m H+1)2 (13)
Notice for later use that the prots of an upstream and a downstream rm when the entity I is the empty set
(namely, H = K = 0) are given by (for details, see Appendix):
  =
(  )2
2
n
(m+ 1)
2
(n+ 1)
and  =
(  )2
2
m2
(m+ 1)
2
(n+ 1)
2 : (14)
2.3 Stability in the linear model
Now we are in a position to examine stability properties for vertical agreements in the model we have just
reminded. In the next proposition, we show that the unanimous vertical agreement plays a crucial role in the
analysis.
Remind that the prot sharing rule consists of any rule guaranteeing to each member of the entity at least as
much as it would receive when being outside of it, taking into account the resulting change in the prots. Given
the total prots of the entity I(K;H); such a rule is equivalent to distributing at least an amount of prots
K i (K   1; H) to the insiders downstream rms and an amount of prots at least equal to H  j (K;H   1)
to insiders upstream rms. Translated into the linear model described above, the condition for internal stability
thus rewrites as:
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i (K   1; H) +
I(K;H) 

K i (K   1; H) +H   j (K;H   1)

K +H
 i (K   1; H); (15)
 j (K;H   1) +
I(K;H) 

K i (K   1; H) +H   j (K;H   1)

K +H
  j (K;H   1): (16)
As for external stability, the conditions are given by
i (K;H) +
I (K + 1; H) 

(K + 1) i (K;H) +H   j (K + 1; H   1)

K + 1 +H
 i (K;H); (17)
 j (K;H) +
I(K;H + 1) 

K i (K   1; H + 1) + (H + 1)   j (K;H)

K +H + 1
  j (K;H): (18)
The natural question, one may ask at this point of the analysis is whether there always exists some stable
vertical agreement. This question is particularly interesting to solve since we know that no stable agreement
exists in the case of horizontal mergers (see Sha¤er, 1995). Using the denition of stability, the payo¤s in
(11) ; (12) ; (13),(14) and the prot sharing rule, we can state the following
Proposition 1 For all m and n; the corresponding unanimous vertical agreement is stable.
Proof. Notice that the unanimous vertical agreement is always externally stable. Indeed, it requires the
inequalities (17) and (18) to be satised at K + 1 and H + 1: However, K = n and H = m at the unanimous
vertical agreement. Therefore these two inequalities are redundant and accordingly should not be taken into
account when checking for stability of the unanimous vertical agreement. Accordingly, the check for stability
is complete when the conditions for internal stability are satised. These conditions are immediately obtained
from (15) and (16) by letting K = n and H = m in these expressions. It is easily seen that both these conditions
are satised if and only if
I(K;H) 

K i (K   1; H) +H   j (K;H   1)

K +H
 0:
For K = n and H = m, we have
I(K;H) 

K i (K   1; H) +H   j (K;H   1)

K +H
=
1
4 (m+ n)
> 0:
Q.E.D.
This proposition should be contrasted with the result provided by Sha¤er (1995) for the case of pure horizon-
tal agreements. In Sha¤ers framework, the corresponding unanimous agreement is never stable for n exceeding
3. Thus, allowing the upstream rms to also participate in the collusive agreement considerably enhances the
interest of the participants to agglomerate all rms in a single entity.
Notice that the main di¢ culty of proving stability for vertical agreements di¤erent from the unanimous one
comes from establishing the inequality (18). Indeed, when the vertical agreement comprises H < m and K < n
rms, then the outsider upstream rms are always willing to enter into the entity because the inequality (18)
is generally not satised (for instance, it is always the case for the entity composed of one downstream and one
upstream rm, as in Gaudet and Van Long (1996). Thus, it appears that the entity exerts a strong attraction
force on the outsiders upstream rms. In fact, proposition 1 only holds because there remains no outsider
upstream rm available when all of them are already members of the entity!
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It would be interesting to know whether the unanimous vertical agreement is the only stable one. The proof
of this uniqueness property should require that the two following inequalities are satised:
I(K;H) [Ki (K 1;H)+H j (K;H 1)]
K+H > 0;
I(K;H+1) [Ki (K 1;H+1)+(H+1) j (K;H)]
K+H+1 >
I(K;H) [Ki (K 1;H)+H j (K;H 1)]
K+H
:
The rst inequality guarantees that the entity involving K downstream rms and H downstream rms is
internally stable. Whereas, the second inequality implies that, whenever an entity involvingK downstream rms
and H downstream rms is internally stable, then the same entity is never externally stable for the upstream
rms. These two conditions clearly imply that the entity involving K downstream rms and H downstream
rms is unstable. The full-edged analysis of these two inequalities turns out to be rather algebraically intricate
due to the complexity of the functions and the number of variables. However, we were able to show that
Proposition 2 There are values for K;H;m and n for which there exists a stable agreement which di¤ers from
the unanimous one.
Proof. Internal stability of an entity including K = n   1 and H = m   2 requires m < (518  72n) =27:
External stability of a downstream rm requires n > 5:External stability for an upstream rm in turn is satised
if and only if m > (110  27n) =8: It turns out that all these inequalities are simultaneously compatible: for
instance they are all simultaneously satised for K = 5; H = 1;m = 3; n = 6: Q.E.D.
Hence, in an economy with three rms in the input market and six rms in the output market, not only
the unanimous agreement is stable. A vertical agreement involving one upstream rm and ve downstream
rms is also stable. It can easily be checked numerically that these two vertical agreements are the only two
stable agreements in this economy. Why is this case? Why only that "interior" vertical agreements is stable?
The intuition of the existence of the unanimous stable agreement is, as we explained above, that the upstream
external stability is satised when no other rm is active in the market but all rms are inside the entity. While
the stability of the interior agreement is obtained by the balance of the three e¤ects of a collusive agreement:
the balance among the prot generated by the entity shared per capita to the downstream and upstream rms
in the agreement, the prot of the downstream rm as an outsider and the prot of an upstream as an outsider.
This balance is not a monotonic function of neither n;m;H nor K: Consequently, a general rule on n;m;H and
K that satisfy conditions (15), (16), (17) and (18) for the linear model is not feasible.
Another interesting issue is the e¤ect on stability of the simultaneous entry of a new rm in the upstream
and the downstream markets. This question can easily be answered.
Proposition 3 The entry of a new pair of downstream and upstream rms destroys the stability of the unani-
mous agreement with n downstream and m upstream rms
Proof. The condition for internal stability of a vertical agreement including n  1 downstream and m  1
upstream rms requires that m < (359  27n) =32: Similarly, the condition for downstream rms for external
stability of a vertical agreement including n   1 downstream and m   1 upstream rms requires that n > 9;
whereas the condition for upstream rms for external stability requires m > 6: Consequently, there exists no
value of n and m for which these conditions can be simultaneously satised, implying that a vertical agreement
with n  1 downstream and m  1 upstream rms can never be stable. Q.E.D.
Of course, after the entry of a new pair of rms, the stability is restored for the unanimous agreement
involving now n+ 1 downstream and m+ 1 upstream rms.
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3 Conclusion
In this paper, we tackle the stability problem of collusive agreements not only involving some downstream
rms, but also embodying some upstream rms, providing the nal market with a specic input. In other
words, we extend the stability analysis from pure horizontal collusive agreements to entities involving some
degree of vertical agreements. This endeavour is made possible due to the exibility of the stability concept
introduced above, but also to the framework of successive oligopolies introduced elsewhere by the authors (see
Gabszewicz and Zanaj (2011)). This extension is important because many real-life collusive agreements embody
both upstream and downstream rms, inuencing thereby the outcomes obtained both in the upstream and
downstream market.
Our analysis reveals that, in the linear model, the unanimous vertical agreement is always stable: this
proposition holds in full generality and should be contrasted with the proposition by Sha¤er (1995) according
to which no stable cartel exists in the case of horizontal cartel agreements when n > 3: thus, stable vertical
entities exist for market structures in which pure horizontal cartels would all be unstable. It also reveals that the
introduction of vertical agreements weakens the Stigler statement according to which "the major di¢ culty in
forming a cartel is that it is more protable to be outside a cartel than to be a participant". In the framework of
successive oligopolies, the marginal cost of downstream rms is no longer exogenous, as in the case of horizontal
agreements. When the entity also comprises upstream rms, it reduces the number of input suppliers in the
upstream market, restricting thereby competition in this market, leading in turn to an increase in the input
price. Furthermore, the presence of the upstream rms in the agreement increases the di¤erences in production
costs between the insider and outsider downstream rms. Therefore, the entity exerts a strong attraction force
on the outsiders upstream rms, di¤erently from what is argued by Stigler (1950), according to whom the
only rms that gain from a cartel are the outsiders. In the case of vertical agreements, often the outsiders are
willing to become insiders. This attraction force explains why external stability is so di¢ cult to obtain in the
framework of vertical agreements.
Our paper has only scratched the surface of what looks like a promising area for further research. Many
questions are still remaining open after our analysis. First, a natural question consists in evaluating the welfare
e¤ects of vertical agreements. With this respect, two forces operate in opposite directions. On the one hand,
the entry of upstream rms should increase welfare to the extent that it dampens the negative e¤ects of double
marginalization. But, on the other hand, the higher the number of downstream rms entering the agreement,
the more concentrated the power in the downstream market.
Second, how robust are the conclusions of the paper ? It is clear that, like most of the previous research in
this eld, its conclusions hold in the framework of the linear model. It would be interesting to examine more
e¢ cient types of pricing as the two part-tari¤s. In that case, the rst e¤ect of the vertical collusive agreement,
namely the elimination of the double marginalization, would disappear. The second e¤ect would remain under
the assumption that downstream rms do not buy from suppliers that are not part of the collusive agreement
(for instance see Nocke and White (2007) on the "outlet e¤ect"). Clearly, the protability of the agreement in
that setup would be di¤erent so di¤erent would be the type of stable equilibria that would emerge. Nevertheless,
the main message of our paper would be invariant.
Finally, the institutional forms of collusive agreements observed in real life are by far more complex than
those evoked in this paper where the agreement reduces simply to the acceptance to belong to the entity or
not. In particular, merging existing rms often takes the form of acquisition of one rm by another. Such
acquisitions reveal the existence of a market where rms are exchanged among rms, opening the door of a
whole range of potential arrangements among rms. The various potential forms of vertical agreements raises
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the interesting question of what could be the optimal structure of the market. Also this interesting issue has
still to be explored in depth in the future.
Appendix
In here, we briey summarize the equilibrium market solution of successive oligopolies when no vertical agree-
ment takes place. Reconsider the same economy as in Section (2.2) in absence of any agreement. Then, the
prot i(qi; q i) of a downstream rm is i(qi; q i) = ((1   qi  
P
j 6=i qj)qi    qi ):Assuming a symmetric
equilibrium in the downstream market, we obtain the optimal output quantity as a function of the input price
!, namely nqi =
n( !)
(n+1) : The market clearing condition in the input market, nqi =
Pm
k=1 sk; gives the inverse
input demand function: !(
Pm
j=1 sj) =  2 n+1n
Pm
k=1 sk: Then, the prot function of the j_th upstream rm
is given by  j(sj ; s j) = (!(
Pm
j=1 sj) )sj : At the symmetric equilibrium, we obtain s(n;m) = n( )2(n+1)(m+1)
and ! = +mm+1 ; q
 = m( )(n+1)(m+1) : This equilibrium solution yields the level of prots in (14) :
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